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ORTHODOXY AS A FIGHT FLAG FOR COSSACK AUTONOMY
WITHIN THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH
The relevance of the article is conditioned by the need to uncover the genesis of state-developing
processes in Ukraine as part of the European socio-cultural space of New time. The purpose of the
study is to find out the basic principles and ways of forming the idea of Cossack autonomy in the
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the end of XVI - the first half of XVII c. The methodology is
based on the application of general scientific (analysis, synthesis, retrospection) and specifically
historical (problem-chronological, historical-comparative and critical-analytical) methods of
scientific research. It clarifies the genesis of the self-government of the Zaporozhye community
and the extension of its principles to the Dnieper region. Key focus is dedicated to the role of
Orthodoxy in this process via the leaders of Zaporozhian Army and Ukrainian high clergy. The
author proves that the principles of self-government as an important factor of autonomy were
formulated in Zaporozhian Sich. This led to the appearance of various political projects, where
the leading role was assigned to the Zaporozhian Army. The union of the Cossack elite with the
Orthodox hierarchs promoted an awareness of the positions of both parties in the conditions of
Polish expansion. It was fully manifested during the Cossack rebellions in Ukraine in the 20-30s of
the XVII c., which led to the formation of the idea of Cossack autonomy within the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth. The results of the research will contribute to the study of the evolution of the
state idea in early modern Ukraine.
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Introduction
It is difficult to overestimate the value of the confessional
factor in the life of early modern society. It dominated the
moral values, really influenced the social behavior of the
individual and the whole stratas of the population. The
religious issue became of extreme urgency in Ukraine
after the Brest Union in 1596, which was manifested in the
speeches of the Orthodox nobility at the gatherings and
meetings, in the works of polemic writers, and in the
activities of fraternities. However, the most effective power
in upholding of Orthodoxy was the Cossacks. The key to
success was the close alliance of Zaporozhian Army
leaders with senior clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church. Each side set its own goal, but their tasks were
often consensual. Cossacks' fight for strata rights went
alongside with the upholding of the Orthodox faith and the
growth of power that the Orthodox clergy could rely on in
the conditions of Catholic expansion in Ukraine. This topic
was partially covered in national historiography. For
example, Mikhailo Hrushevsky provided a wide picture of
the Cossacks' fight for class rights and privileges (Hru-
shevsky, 1995). Volodymyr Holobutsky (Holobutsky, 1994)
emphasized the social factor of the Cossack movement's
deployment. The author of this work has analyzed the
importance of the confessional factor in the formation of
the Cossack strata (Shcherbak, 2006). However, the role
of Orthodoxy in shaping the idea of Cossack autonomy
remained unaddressed. The purpose of this article is to
find out the grounds of Cossacks' autonomy in the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth and the role of the confes-
sional factor in it.
Methods
The methodological basis of the article is the principles
of historicism, systematicity and objectivity in the approach
to clarify events in the past. General scientific (analysis,
synthesis, retrospection) and specific historical (problem-
chronological, historical-comparative, critical-analytical)
methods are used while solving stated tasks.
Results
The modern concept of autonomy - the special status
of entities that exist within a state on the basis of broad
self-government, is incorrectly applied unconditionally to
the early modern era. At the same time, self-government
is a fundamental principle of legalized independace. The
fact of recognition was, as a rule, based on the formed
phenomenon, the duration of which was different. This
thesis is quite adequate to the genesis of the idea of
Cossack autonomy within the Polish-Lithuanian Com-
monwealth.
It is quite obvious that Zaporozhian Sich did not have a
separate legal status, but the absence of legal grounds
does not deny the fact of its existence with specific self-
government in the second half of the XVI c. It initiated the
idea of the Zaporozhye community as a self-sufficient
military and political union in relations not only with the
government of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but
also with the outside world. The Cossack system en-
visaged the functioning of the Cossack Council, which
addressed the most important issues of community life
through a narrow circle of senior leaders, which is led by
the otaman. So there was actual autonomy in Zaporozhye,
which is designated in the national historiography as "the
Cossack Christian Republic" (Nalyvaiko, 1992). Its priority
values were knightly dignity and fight against enemies of
Orthodoxy.
Separate elements of the autonomy of Zaporozhian





Sich at the end of the XVI c. spread to the populated areas
during the Cossack rebellions. In the territories controlled
by the rebels, local authorities were liquidated and self-
government was established similar to the Zaporozhye
one. Feeling the real threat to its existence, local officials
repeatedly appealed to the higher state authorities in order
to suppress the "Cossack outrage". Cherkasy and Kaniv
head Oleksandr Vyshnevetsky wrote to the royal chancellor
Jan Zamoysky that the chief of the Zaporozhian army
registry, Christopher Kosinsky, having collected two
thousand Cossacks, "spilled the blood of innocent (nobility.
- V.Shch.) in royal lands, castles, cities, and other pos-
sessions of nobles were burned, devastated ..., wanted to
turn upside down all the royal border lands and cut us all
out" (Listy, 1886: 27). O. Vyshnevetsky also noted the
intention of the Cossack leader to submit to the rule of the
Moscow tsar. The Polish chronicler Martin Bielski even
wrote that Christoph Kosinsky sought to do more than
"harm" towards Prince Konstantin Ostrozky (Kronika, 1856:
1689). The nobility also stressed anxiety in an appeal from
January 11, 1593 to the Lutsk city court. According to its
statement, the Cossacks in Volhyn "force to swear alle-
giance" (Archive, 1863: 39).
The result of noble reports was the appearance of the
constitution of the general seim as of June 15, 1593, which
in particular stated: "people, who arbitrarily gather in groups
without permission, committing assaults and violence or
intending to cross illegally the border of our country, should
be considered enemies of their homeland and traitors,
and therefore hired (kwartz) detachments can be sent
against them in case of necessity without any litigation;
each of them should defend himself against them in their
houses and estates" (Peasant Movement, 1993: 346).
Numerous complaints of the nobility were observed in
the next three years. From Bratslavshchina it was reported
that the Cossacks abolished the local administration, taxed
noble property with indemnity and set their own court.
Mikhailo Hrushevsky suggested the possibility of threa-
tening by Cossack leaders against the Polish-noble regime
(Hrushevsky, 1995, 7: 306). Without denying this thesis, it
should be noted that the lack of documentary evidence
directly from the Cossack environment, as well as the
thoughtful and corrected actions of the rebels aimed at
counteracting foreign domination, cast doubt on it. Another
thing is how Cossacks' enemies perceived the situation.
Thus, the Crown Hetman Stanislav Zholkiewski wrote in a
letter to King Sigismund III from military camp near Supoy
river on May 21, 1596: "It is disgusting to recall what they
told about you, in which terms they mentioned your royal
mercy, which plans they made about Krakiw, the glorious
capital of your royal mercy, concerning the demolition and
destruction of the noble state" (Pisma, 1861: 151). During
a conversation with Papal Cardinal Enrico Gaetano with
Chancellor Jan Zamoisky in Warsaw, the latter noted that
during negotiations of Semeriy Nalyvaiko with the
Ambassador of Austrian archduke Maximilian, "anti-Polish
plans" took place. The Polish nobility also regarded the
acceptance of korogva (flag) by Zaporozhian Cossaks from
the German Emperor Rudolf II as treason of the crown of
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Even after the
Solonitsky massacre, taking into account the growing
Cossack power, Stanislav Zholkevsky wrote to the King
about the need "for fear to place the army (on the Dnieper.
- V.Shch.), and also equally necessary thing is that your
royal mercy to give orders to starostas and royal land
administrators to prevent the beginnings (separate spee-
ches. - V.Shch.), either alone or through their deputies,
and not to allow evil to grow" (Listy, 1886: 80). For a deeper
persuasion, the hetman offered to severely punish the
rebels.
Obviously, it was the knowledge of Cossack attitude
that inspired Kiyv Catholic bishop Joseph Vereshchinsky
in 1596 to develop a project of organization of the Dnieper
Cossack state which is headed by a prince. The military
power, according to this project, should belong to the
hetman of the Zaporozhian Army. Each of the 13 regiments
was not only a military unit but also an administrative-
territorial unit. The colonel also executed the functions of
local military and civilian authority. It is significant that the
regiment was given land property, which would have to
resolve the issue of material support of the Zaporozhian
Army (Sas, 1992: 59-61; Wereszczyński, 1911: 12-15).
Thus, bishop Joseph Vereshchinsky made an impor-
tant step towards the formation of a program of Cossack
autonomy. However, the Polish government rejected the
project because its developer had unleashed a stereo-
typical view of the Cossacks as mercenaries and unau-
thorized soldiers. According to Vereshchinsky, they are just
as knights as the nobility, and can expect to obtain the
status of full subjects of the Polish-Lithuanian Common-
wealth. Even the defeat of the rebellions of the 90s did not
stop the Cossacks' appeal to knightly ideals and the efforts
to be recognized as "crown sons" with claims to the right
for the Dnieper lands as an area of their exclusive interests.
The Cossacks' assertion of rights and privileges coin-
cided chronologically with the policy of the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth Government in the confessional realm at
the beginning of the XVII c. The support of Catholicism and
Uniatism led to the oppression of Orthodoxy in Ukraine. In
accordance there is a manifestation of Cossack solidarity
with the clergy in the face of a common threat. Thus, in the
spring of 1610, the Uniate Metropolitan Ipatii Poti tried to
subordinate Kiyv churches and to incite the local clergy
towards the Uniate. That end, he sent the governor Anthony
Grekovich to Kiyv, but there Orthodoxy felt the support of the
Cossack armed forces. Grekovich's call of Kiyv priests to
St. Sophia Cathedral for a joint service was unsuccessful.
On the contrary, the clergy campaigned among the
parishioners, warning that whoever comes to the church
will be baptized into another's faith. A small detachment of
Cossacks located in front of Sofia, stopping the arriving
citizens.
Grekovich sealed the church not to allow the Orthodox
to carry out its service. Cossack representatives led by
Gregory Sereda, from its side, filed a protest to the Kyiv
City Court on behalf of the Zaporozhians against accusation
them by the Uniate metropolitan. "And we, also," the
document stated, "being the sons of the cathedral apos-
tolic eastern church, by the name of the whole Cossacks
Zaporozhians Army ... to their mercy of the peoples of the
Orthodox faith and ancient religion and in the face of
spiritual persons not secessionists (Uniates. - V.Shch.)
and not …. protest against the invasion into our ancient
Orthodox church" (Acts, 1865: 59). The striving to defend
the ancient Orthodox faith sounded in the letter of the
Cossack Hetman Hryhoriy Tiskinevich to the Kiyv voivoda
deputy Mikhail Kholonevsky of May 29, 1610: "For our
Eastern church and for the Greek faith we will lay our heads
... and give our knighty word to defend" (Acts, 1865: 66).
There was also a warning, if the Uniate governor did not
renounce his intention, he would be punished.
Joint struggle of the Ukrainian Cossacks and the
Orthodox clergy was conditioned by refusal of general seim
to consider a question of "Greek faith" and the participation
of the Cossacks in the campaigns of the Crown Army to
Moscow. The respective complains on "Cossacks outrage"
from the nobility appeared again in the resolutions of





various district seims, as well as the proposals to subor-
dinate Cossacts under starostas (admonistrators) juris-
diction. Despite of threatening governmental resolutions,
the Cossacks did not recognize starosta's authority and
conducted various forms of their own justice. In 1616, one
of the ambassadors drew attention of the seim to the fact
that the Cossacks did not recognize "neither the magist-
rates in the cities, nor the starostas or hetmans; they
establish their own right, choose their own officials and
leaders, and it seems they create own republic in the Great
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Zherela, 1908: 124).
One might consider such evaluation as an exaggeration if
it were not repeated from time to time.
The significance of the confessional factor in asserting
Cossack rights was clearly manifested during the mission
of Jerusalem Patriarch Feofan to Ukraine in 1620. Already
at the border with Moscow, he was met by hetman of
Zaporozhian Army Peter Sagaydachny and escorted to Kiyv.
In the house of the Epiphany fraternity in Podil the patriarch
was under the protection of magistrate authorities and
special Cossack security. Subsequently, Feofanes visited
the Cossack Trakhtemir Monastery, Kaniv and Cherkasy,
that caused concern of the Polish authorities. There were
grounds for concern, since the Ukrainian clergy had
benefited with the visit. In its circles it was stated the
intention to restore the Orthodox Church hierarchy without
the King's consent. This question became a major issue
at the congregation which was convened during the temple
feast on August 15, 1620 at the Kiev-Pechersk Monastery.
Representatives from Volhyn, Podillya, Pokuttya, Pidlashia,
Lithuania, together with Cossacks, citizens and Orthodox
nobles, requested the patriarch Feofan to perform an act
of consecration. Petro Sahaidachny dispersed hesitation
and fears of the latter to have "troubles with the King and
the Poles" by guaranteeing the patriarch's security when
leaving Ukraine. The decisive role of the Cossacks in the
restoration of the Orthodox hierarchy is emphasized in
the work of Iov Boretsky "Protestation": "knightly people
and passionate in his spirit (Feofan. - V.Shch.) said: "You
would not be Christ's apostolic governor if you did not
consecrate or abandon your greatness to the people of
the Rusian metropolitan and bishops, leaving us
persecuted here and without shepherds" (Boretsky, 1998:
317). As a result of such a statement, in October 1620,
Patriarch Feofan consecrated Iov Boretsky as Metropo-
litan of Kiyv and Halych and five Orthodox hierarchs as
bishops (Zhukovich, 1906: 43-44).
The understanding of the political situation by the
Ukrainian clergy was also traced during the Cossack
Council in the area of Sukha Dibrova in the summer of
1621, where the question of participation in the war with
Turkey was decided. Metropolitan Iov Boretsky, Bishop of
Vladimir Yezikiil Kurtsevich and 300 priests arrived at the
council. The Metropolitan called on the Cossacks to defend
the Orthodoxy against the "busmurans" (Vikul, 1894: 48).
On behalf of the Zaporozhian Army, an embassy headed
by Peter Sahaidachny went to the King.
As reported by one of the Uniate publicists, the content
of the petition filed by the Cossack ambassadors was
reduced mainly to the administration of religious affairs.
First of all, it was about the approval of the royal charters of
the newly appointed hierarchs in their lands and the
abolition of universals recently issued against the Ortho-
dox. In case of acceptance of these requirements, the
Cossacks declared themselves to serve the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth (Hrushevsky, 1995, 7: 465).
After the successful completion of the Khotyn war, the
Cossacks, which played crucial role in it, did not back down
from their demands, including the denominational ones.
Embassy of Cossacks again went to Warsaw. One of the
points in their petition concerned the "reassurance of our
ancient Greek faith." Sigismund III's refusal to grant the
Cossacks' request led to a further escalation of social
tension in Ukraine, and in 1625 a new rebellion broke out
in the Dnieper region.
The punishers could not resolve the conflict with the
help of weapon, instead they concluded a compromised
Kurukivska agreement, where the Cossacks achieved
rights to assert rights on a certain territory. One of the
clauses of the agreement contained information about
formation of six registry regiments upon the territorial
principle - Bilotserkivskyi, Pereyaslavskyi, Korsunskyi,
Kanivskyi, Chyhyrynskyi and Cherkasy. Obviously, it was
on the basis of this document requirenments of rebellions
led by Taras Fedorovich were formulated in 1630 about
the withdrawal of the Crown troops to the West of the Bila
Tserkva. By the way, in the Hetman's universals, alongside
the Cossack demands, for the first time it was stated "fight
for faith". The Crown Hetman Stanislav Konecpolsky also
emphasized the religious aspect of the rebellion led by
Fedorovich in his speech at the Seim in 1631: "There were
letters from some spiritial and secular persons where they
stated that their faith is being ruined, churches being taken
and they ask for defence; these rumors annoyed poor
people and stirred up the whole Ukraine, so that none of
the nobility there was safe in their home" (Peasant Move-
ment, 1993: 239).
A clearer definition of the scope that the Cossacks were
prepared to defend is contained in the decision of the
Korsunska Council of 1632, which it was declared that
"they did not give up the peasant faith; if Poles press further
on their faith they will appeal to the Tsar and Grand Duke
Mikhail Fedorovich of All Russia, so that the sovereign may
have welcomed them, ordered to take under his state hand,
and they, Belarusians and Cherkasians, will stand on the
Dnieper for their faith." (Reunion, 1954, 1: 129). For the
first time the Cossacks came up with the idea of asserting
their rights in a certain territory, namely Left Bank Ukraine.
In essence, it was about the intentions to form own Cos-
sack republic.
In the same year, during the royal election, the Cossacks
made a great deal of effort for the appearance of "The
Articles to appease the Rusians people", which legalized
the Orthodox Church hierarchy in Ukraine and Belarus.
Kyiv was recognized as the center of the metropolis. A
special commission which was set up at the Coronation
Seim was supposed to deal with the redistribution of church
property between the Orthodox and the Uniates. An
important factor in the stabilization of Orthodoxy was the
approval of Petro Mohyla in the post of Metropolitan of Kyiv
and Galicia, which was offic ially recognized by the
government of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The
legalization of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine had little
effect on the practice of local administrators. W hile
pursuing governmental policies, they supported the
position of Roman Catholics and Uniates in every possible
way, despite the constant protests by the Orthodox. The
mood of the latter was clearly manifested during the next
large-scale Cossack rebellion of 1637-1638. Thus, in the
universal as of November 4, 1637, the Cossack Colonel
Karpo Skidan addressed not only to the Cossacks, but
also to all the "Commonwealth people", calling himself
"the guardian of all Ukraine". The message, in particular,
stated: "We announce to you, our comrades, that we have
received a message about the decisive intentions of the
zhovnirs, who are probably already gathering to Ukraine,
in which God does not help them. Therefore, by the power
of my authority and by the name of the army, I command





and confirm that you should not be kept safe but to stock
up of horses, bread, and weapons, and be ready to with-
stand as knights against these oppressors of our Greek
faith when necessary." (Dyaryusz, 1858: 26). Therefore,
the Cossacks' advocacy of corporate interests was
accompanied by a desire to protect Orthodoxy in Ukraine.
Referring to the officers of registry army, the Cossack
hetman Pavlo But upbraided them for forgetting the
decision of the Kurukivska commission, according to which
the Crown troops were not to be stationed on the Left Bank.
According to one source, he also stated that he hoped to
become the "owner of the land of Rusia". In another case
Pavlyuk stated: "when the King and the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth need the service of the Zaporozhian Army
against some enemy, we will all unanimously depart from
our places at the call of the King and his ambassadors;
and when there is no need in the Zaporozhian Army,
whoever wants to live under military kleynodes in Zapo-
rozhye, let him live freely, and who wants to look after his
property, let him look after and live freely" (Dyaryusz, 1858:
43). So the Cossack leaders saw the future of Ukraine as
part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in democratic
forms of government.
It is likely that the moods in the Cossack environment
influenced on the formulation of "The Ordinatsii (Reso-
lution) of Zaporizhzhya Registry Army", which was approved
by the general Seim in the spring of 1638. According to the
resolution, the Cossacks were forbidden to live in cities
other than the border - Cherkasy, Chigirin and Korsun to
prevent any possible opposition against the local
government. Obviously, the territorial restriction of habitats
became the impulse for the continuation of the Cossack
rebellion in the summer of 1638. Hetman Dmitry Huni's
message repeats the thesis of a vision of a unified
community of residents of the Dnieper region whose
interests should be protected. "Obviously," the document
says, "there is no truth or fear of God here, whether let it be
with us, to conduct war with the Zaporozhian Army, who
dared to sacrifice our lives and surrendered to the will of
the highest God for our bloody merits and for that innocently
shed our blood, and indeed the innocent and poor people
were given the peace that the voice and the innocent blood
spilled cry out for vengeance to God and excite us to that"
(Reunion, 1954, 1: 237).
More successfully, the idea of Cossack autonomy under
the flag of Orthodoxy was realized with the start of the
Liberation War. During the negotiations of the rebellion
leaders with the embassy of the Crown Hetman Mykola
Potocki in Zaporozhian Sich in March 1648 requirements
were formulated, the main one was concerned with the
withdrawal of the kwartz (hired) army from the "Dnieper
and Ukraine" and abolished here the "management of the
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth". That is, it was about
the separation of the Cossack region into the autonomous
formation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The
victory of the Ukrainian army under Zhovti Vody and Korsun
fortified its position. In universals of Bohdan Khmelnitsky
which were distributed among population response, there
was an intent to liquidate the current authorities, and to
indroduce its own which is led by hetman. The absence
of complete sources is not allowed to find out the status
of new formation in the Dnieper, obviously, there is
region with broad autonomous rights. Anyway the
realization of the plan should lead to the satisfaction of
Cossack needs and strenthening of the royal power as
a guarantee of restraint of magnate and noble outrage. At
the same time, Vladyslav IV death significantly influenced
plans of B. Khmelnitsky. Having lost the protector in a
person of the King, the Cossacks paid attention on the
Orthodox Moscow Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich as a potential
candidate for the throne of the Polish-Lithuanian Com-
monwealth. Thanks to his support, it was planned to equate
the Cossack status with the nobility and to create wide
autonomy in "Ukraine". The candidacy of the Transylvanian
prince seemed also promising in the Cossacks view.
Unjustified expectations forced B. Khmelnitsky to support
Jan Kazimir's candidacy for the monarchic throne.
According to some researchers, this led to a military
campaign on Western lands, during which the hetman
articulated more moderate proposals, in particular to
increase the number of the registry army, protection of the
Orthodox Church and subordination of the Zaporozhian
Army exclusively to the King.
A powerful factor for the hetman's realization of the
purpose of the struggle was his meeting with Jerusalem
Patriarch Paisii in late 1648. In European political life, the
consecration of a ruler of the state by a hierarch was one
of the most important elements in recognizing his divine
rights. According to legends, a similar rite was held over
B. Khmelnitsky. Thereby his power was recognized as
"Prince of Rus" all over the territory which was controlled
by the Cossacks (Plokhii, 2005: 293). Cossack ambas-
sador to Moscow Siluyan Muzhilovsky at the beginning of
1649 emphasized the fact that freed territory from the Poles
"became permanently their Cossack land, not Polish and
not Lithuanian" and they live "freely" in those places (Kryp
Svidkevich, 1990: 226).
Royal commissioners also noted the radial change
in Hetman's behavior and self-esteem during nego-
tiations in Pereyaslav in February 1649. In the same place,
B. Khmelnitsky announced the intention to merge all
Rusian / Ukrainian lands in ethnic boundaries by pointing
to the Western border "along Lviv, Holm and Halych"
(Reunion, 1954, 2: 118). In fact, for the first time the hetman
officially declared his intention to create independant
Ukrainian state.
Conclusions
The main principles of self-government as an important
factor of autonomy were formulated by the leaders of
Zaporozhian Sich. This led to the appearance of various
political projects, in which the leading role was assigned
to the Zaporozian Army. Cossack's struggle for rights and
privileges coincided with the escalation of the denomi-
national situation in Ukraine. The union of the Cossack
leaders with the Orthodox hierarchs in the first half of the
XVII c. promoted awareness of the positions of both parties
in conditions of Polish expansion. During the Cossack
rebellions, among the slogans of their leaders, an impor-
tant place belonged to the protection of Orthodoxy. Social
ideals and political values cherished by Cossacks became
the catalyst for state formation in Ukraine which manifested
itself in the idea of Cossack autonomy within the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth.
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ПРАВОСЛАВ'Я ЯК ПРАПОР БОРОТЬБИ ЗА КОЗАЦЬКУ АВТОНОМІЮ
В СКЛАДІ РЕЧІ ПОСПОЛИТОЇ
Актуальність статті обумовлена потребою розкриття генези державотворчих процесів в Україні як части-
ни європейського соціокультурного простору Нового часу. Мета студії полягає у з'ясуванні основних засад
і шляхів формування ідеї козацької автономії в Речі Посполитій наприкінці XVI - першій половині XVII ст.
Методологія заснована на застосуванні загальнонаукових (аналіз, синтез, ретроспекція) та специфічно
історичних (проблемно-хронологічних, історико-порівняльних та критично-аналітичних) методів наукового
дослідження. Аргументовано висвітлено ґенезу самоврядування запорозької спільноти та поширення її
принципів на територію Подніпров'я. Увага акцентується на ролі православ'я в цьому процесі через спілку
очільників Війська Запорозького та українських духовних ієрархів. Автор доводить, що засади самовряд-
ності як важливого чинника автономії були сформульовані на Запорозькій Січі. Це зумовило появу різних
політичних проектів, в яких провідна роль відводилася Війську Запорозькому. Союз козацької верхівки з
православними ієрархами сприяв усвідомленню позицій обох сторін в умовах польської експансії. Повною
мірою він проявився під час козацьких повстань в Україні 20-30-х років XVII ст., що зумовило формування
ідеї козацької автономії в межах Речі Посполитої. Результати дослідження сприятимуть вивченню еволюції
державної ідеї в ранньомодерній Україні.
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